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Abstract.
In this paper we present the rationale adopted for the integration of the knowledge level of DUAL-PECCS, a cognitive system
for conceptual representation and categorization, with two different cognitive architectures: SOAR and LIDA. In previous works
we already showed how the representational and reasoning framework adopted in DUAL-PECCS was integrable with diverse
cognitive architectures, i.e. ACT-R and CLARION, making different representational assumptions and adopting diverse knowl-
edge processing mechanisms. The additional integrations presented here suggest that the underlying knowledge representation
and reasoning structure adopted in DUAL-PECCS can be used as a unifying framework for the knowledge level of agents en-
dowed with different cognitive architectures. The current version of the system has been experimentally assessed in a task of
conceptual categorization where a target concept illustrated by a simple common-sense linguistic description had to be identified
by resorting to a mix of categorization strategies. The output has then been compared to human and artificial responses. The
novel integration allowed us to extend our previous evaluation.
Keywords: Knowledge Representation, Categorization, Conceptual Spaces, Cognitive Architectures, SOAR, LIDA, Heterogeneous
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1. Introduction
In this work we present a novel version of the
DUAL-PECCS system [40], integrated with two di-
verse Cognitive Architectures: SOAR [26] and LIDA
[16]. The result of such novel integrations suggests
that the underlying knowledge representation and pro-
cessing mechanisms adopted in DUAL-PECCS can
be considered as a plausible candidate for providing a
unifying representation and reasoning framework for
agents endowed with different cognitive architectures.
The DUAL-PECCS conceptual architecture is based
on a cognitively-inspired categorization system able to
*Corresponding authors: Antonio Lieto, Daniele P.Radicioni and
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perform, in an integrated way, two well-known types
of common-sense conceptual reasoning in human cog-
nition: prototypical and exemplars-based reasoning.
The system relies on a representational and reasoning
framework designed and implemented according to in-
sights and experimental evidences coming from Cog-
nitive Science. From a representational perspective it
relies on the hypothesis of conceptual structures rep-
resented as heterogeneous proxytypes, proposed and
developed in the area of BICA (Biologically Inspired
Cognitive Architectures) [31]. From a reasoning per-
spective, it integrates both types of the above men-
tioned human-like common-sense reasoning (i.e., pro-
totypical and exemplars-based reasoning) with stan-
dard monotonic categorization procedures according
to the tenets coming from the dual process theory of
reasoning [25].
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This work has the following main strengths: it ex-
tends our previous work [39,40] where the integration
of the common-sense representation and reasoning
system, based on the above mentioned assumptions,
was first attempted into the ACT-R [2] and CLAR-
ION [59] cognitive architectures. Specifically, that sys-
tem is now integrated and tested into two additional
cognitive architectures, SOAR and LIDA, implement-
ing different assumptions on the underlying repre-
sentational and reasoning structures governing human
(and artificial) cognition [28]. Notably, despite the type
of the provided integration is the same of our previous
work (i.e., we provide an extension of the representa-
tions provided in the Declarative Memories of each ar-
chitecture), the two newly integrated CAs are also very
different (from a representational perspective) w.r.t.
the previously integrated ones1. This aspect represents,
therefore, an additional advancement that allows us to
fully collocate the employed representational frame-
work adopted in DUAL-PECCS within the recent de-
bate concerning the identification of a Standard Model
of Mind [27]. In the following, the integration de-
tails are analysed, and the two implementations are
assessed in a conceptual categorization test. Finally,
the whole workflow has been significantly improved
with richer information extraction procedures to au-
tomatically acquire the knowledge base dealing with
common-sense representation and reasoning tasks.
This work is organized as follows: in the first sec-
tions we sketch (by referring to previous work for ad-
ditional details) the main elements inspiring our sys-
tem and its theoretical bases as well as its overall ar-
chitecture; in Section 5 we describe the improvements
related to the automatic generation of common-sense
knowledge; in Section 7 we show how our hybrid sys-
tem for conceptual categorization was integrated into
SOAR and LIDA, and finally we describe the evalua-
tion experiments and elaborate on the future works.
1It is worth-noting that, in this setting, the provided integration
should not be seen as a mere implementation fact. On the contrary,
the implemented integration of our framework with the software in-
stantiations of the involved cognitive architecture follows a previ-
ous, and more complex, integration developed between the abstract
models of cognition assumed by each architecture and our system.
As a consequence, the resulting integration is provided by respecting
the architectural constraints of each of these systems. This means, in
other words, that our work provides evidence that the adopted rep-
resentational framework is cognitively compliant with such diverse
agent architectures.
2. Types of Conceptual Representations
In Cognitive Science different theories about how
humans organise, reason and retrieve conceptual infor-
mation have been proposed. The oldest one, known as
“classical”, states that concepts can be simply repre-
sented in terms of sets of necessary and sufficient con-
ditions. In the mid ’70s of the last Century, however,
Rosch’s experimental results demonstrated its inade-
quacy for ordinary –or common sense– concepts, that
cannot be described in terms of necessary and suffi-
cient traits [57].
In particular, Rosch’s results showed that ordinary
concepts are organized in our mind in terms of pro-
totypes. Since then different theories of concepts have
been proposed to explain different representational and
reasoning aspects concerning the problem of typical-
ity. We recall here the prototype theory and the exem-
plars theory.2 According to the prototype view, knowl-
edge about categories is stored in terms of prototypes,
i.e., in terms of some representation of the most typ-
ical instance of the category. In this view, the con-
cept bird should coincide with the representation of
a typical bird (e.g., a robin). According to the exem-
plar view, a given category is mentally represented as
a set of specific exemplars explicitly stored in mem-
ory: the mental representation of the concept bird is
a set containing the representations of (some of) the
birds we encountered during our past experience. Al-
though these approaches have been largely considered
as competing ones, several results (starting from the
work of Malt [42]) suggested that human subjects may
use, in different occasions, different representations to
retrieve and categorize concepts. Such experimental
evidences led to the development of the so called “het-
erogeneous hypothesis” about the nature of concepts,
hypothesizing that different types of conceptual repre-
sentations coexist at the same time: prototypes, exem-
plars, classical representations, and so on [41].
This hypothesis has been recently extended within
the field of knowledge representation applied to bi-
ologically inspired cognitive architectures: a novel
approach to concept representation has been pro-
posed, considering concepts as “heterogeneous proxy-
types” [31]. In this view, conceptual structures in nat-
ural and artificial cognitive systems and architectures
are assumed to be composed by heterogeneous rep-
resentations (or bodies of knowledge) referring to the
2A review of all the typicality-theories is available in [41].
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same conceptual entity. Each body of knowledge pro-
vides specific types of information and specific ac-
cess and reasoning procedures to the concept it is
referred to. Such heterogeneous representations are
proxytypes [56], in the sense that they can be contextu-
ally activated by external stimuli, coming from the en-
vironment, and ‘go proxy’ in working memory (a sort
of temporary buffer available in human and artificial
memory structures), for their reference category. The
proxyfication may be then the result of activities such
as concept identification, recognition, retrieval, and so
forth. The different types of conceptual representations
hypothesized to coexist in the heterogeneous proxy-
types approach are typicality-based representations of
a given concept (i.e., prototypes and exemplars-based
representations), as well as representations in terms of
necessary and/or sufficient conditions. As an example
of such type of representational hypothesis let us con-
sider the ordinary concept of water. The classical com-
ponent will contain the information that water is ex-
actly the chemical substance whose formula is H2O,
that is the substance whose molecules have two hydro-
gen atoms with a covalent bond to the single oxygen
atom. On the other hand, the prototypical facet of the
concept will grasp that water usually occurs in liquid
state, and is a colourless, odourless and tasteless fluid.
The exemplar-based representations grasp information
on individuals, such as a given instance of water pre-
senting, for example, an unusual water color (e.g., red-
water). According to the heterogeneous proxytypes
approach, the activation in working memory of such
conceptual structures is context-dependent: if an agent
perceives an instance of water in a typical scenario –
for instance, in a bottle– the only type of conceptual
knowledge that will be activated and proxyfied will be
the prototypical knowledge associated to that concept
(and not, for example, the classical or exemplar-based
information associated to the same conceptual entity).
3. A Dual Process Conceptual Categorization
From a reasoning perspective the heterogeneous hy-
pothesis assumes that the retrieval of the above men-
tioned representations is driven by different process
types. In particular, prototype and exemplar-based re-
trieval is based on a fast and approximate kind of cate-
gorization, and benefits from common-sense informa-
tion associated to concepts.3 On the other hand, the
retrieval of classical representation of concepts is fea-
tured by explicit rule following, and makes no use of
common-sense information. These two differing cate-
gorization strategies have been widely studied in psy-
chology of reasoning in the frame of the dual process
theory, that postulates the co-existence of two different
types of cognitive systems [15,25]. The systems of the
first type (type 1) are automatic, associative, parallel
and fast. The systems of the second type (type 2) are
more recent, conscious, sequential and slow, and fea-
tured by explicit rule following. We assume that both
systems can be composed in turn by many sub-systems
and processes.
4. The System
The DUAL-PECCS system relies on both the het-
erogeneous proxytypes approach and on the dual pro-
cess theory of reasoning. The heterogeneous concep-
tual representation has been implemented as a hybrid
knowledge base composed of heterogeneous represen-
tations of the same conceptual entities: that is, the
hybrid knowledge base includes both common-sense
representation (prototypes and exemplars) and classi-
cal representations for the same concept. Then, such
representations are associated with different sorts of
processes: Type 1 processes have been designed to
deal with prototypes- and exemplar-based retrieval and
categorization, while Type 2 processes have been de-
signed to deal with deductive inference.
Following the hypotheses in [18,37] the two sorts
of reasoning processes interact, since Type 1 processes
are executed first and their results are then refined by
Type 2 processes. In the implemented system the typ-
ical representational and reasoning functions are as-
signed to the System 1 (hereafter S1), which executes
processes of Type 1, and is associated to the Concep-
tual Spaces framework [21]. The reasoning functions
herein are implemented as similarity calculations in a
3If we have to categorize a stimulus with the following features:
“it has fur, woofs and wags its tail”, the result of a prototype-based
categorization would be dog, since these cues are associated to the
prototype of dog. Prototype-based reasoning, however, is not the
only type of reasoning based on typicality. In fact, if an exemplar
corresponding to the stimulus being categorized is available too, it
is acknowledged that humans use to classify it by evaluating its sim-
ilarity w.r.t. the exemplar, rather than w.r.t. the prototype associated
to the underlying concepts [19]. This type of common sense catego-
rization is known in literature as exemplars-based categorization.
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metric space. On the other hand, the classical repre-
sentational and reasoning functions are assigned to the
System 2 (hereafter S2) to execute processes of Type
2, and are associated to a standard symbolic based on-
tological representation (in our case the OpenCyc on-
tology [29] was used).
In Section 6 we briefly describe the categorization
pipeline of the system by presenting the dynamics of
the interaction between S1 and S2 processes. In the
following we introduce the two representational and
reasoning frameworks used in our system, by focus-
ing on i) how typicality information (including both
prototypes and exemplars) and their corresponding
non monotonic reasoning procedures can be encoded
through conceptual spaces; and on ii) how classical in-
formation can be naturally encoded in terms of formal
ontologies.
Conceptual spaces (CSs) are a representational
framework where knowledge is represented as a set of
quality dimensions, and where a geometrical or topo-
logical structure is associated to each quality dimen-
sion. Instances can be represented as points in a mul-
tidimensional space, and their similarity can be com-
puted as the intervening distance between each two
points, based on some suitable metrics (such as Eu-
clidean and Manhattan distance, or standard cosine
similarity).4 In this setting, concepts correspond to
convex regions, and regions with different geomet-
rical properties correspond to different sorts of con-
cepts [20,21]. Prototypes have a natural geometrical
interpretation in conceptual spaces, in that they cor-
respond to the geometrical centre of a convex region.
This can be thought of as a centroid, that is the mean
position of all the points in all dimensions. This rep-
resentation also allows us, given a convex region, to
associate each point to a certain centrality degree, that
can be interpreted as a measure of its typicality [22].
This framework has been used also to encode the ex-
emplars, represented as points in the multidimensional
space. Conceptual spaces can be also used to compute
the proximity between any two entities, and between
entities and prototypes. Concepts, in this framework,
are characterized in terms of domains [20,21]. Typi-
cal domain examples are color, size, shape, texture. In
turn, domain information can be specified along some
4A full account of the semantic similarity calculated in the con-
ceptual spaces is out of the scope of this contribution; in the present
setting, distances are computed in a multi-dimensional space that
can be thought of as a vectorial model.
dimensions, e.g., regarding color domain, relevant di-
mensions are hue, chromaticity, and brightness.5
On the other hand, the representation of the classi-
cal information related to a given concept is demanded
to classical ontological formalizations. In this setting,
formal ontologies provide the characterization of con-
cepts in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (if
these conditions exists: as mentioned, most common
sense concepts cannot be characterized in these terms).
Additionally, the ontological representations are used
by the S2 component (as mentioned, in our implemen-
tation it is grounded on the OpenCyc ontology).
Figure 1 shows an example of the heterogeneous
representation for the concept dog. In this example, the
exemplar and prototype-based representations make
use of non classical (or typical) information and, as
mentioned, are represented by using the framework of
the conceptual spaces. Namely, the prototypical rep-
resentation grasps information such as that dogs are
usually conceptualized as domestic animals, with typ-
ically four legs, a tail etc.; the exemplar-based repre-
sentations grasp information on individuals. For exam-
ple, in Fig. 1 it is represented the individual of Lessie,
which is a particular exemplar of dog with white and
brown fur and with a less domestic attitude w.r.t. the
prototypical dog (e.g. its typical location is lawn).
Both sorts of representations activate Type 1 processes.
On the other hand, the classical body of knowledge
is filled with necessary and sufficient information to
characterize the concept (representing, for example,
the taxonomic information that a dog is a mammal and
a carnivore), and activates Type 2 processes. This body
of knowledge is represented with standard ontologi-
cal formalisms and is grounded on OpenCyc). For the
sake of readability the information in Figure 1 is vi-
sualized with a uniform format, even though the dif-
ferent representations are actually encoded in different
formalisms.
With respect to the previous versions of the sys-
tem, one of the main advances of the current version
of DUAL-PECCS is the automatic acquisition of the
portion of the knowledge base encoded as conceptual
spaces. Most existing approaches try to induce con-
ceptual spaces based on distributional semantics by di-
rectly accessing huge amounts of textual documents to
extract the multidimensional feature vectors that de-
5It has been shown that such framework presents some advantages
if introduced, in general cognitive architectures, as intermediate rep-
resentational level between the symbolyc and the subsymbolic one
(for more details on this issue we remind to [33].
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— Hybrid Knowledge Base — 
Typicality-based 
knowledge
Classical 
knowledge
family: mammal
color: brown
hasPart: tail
hasPart: four legs
atLocation: home 
…
Prototypical dog
Prototype
(region centroid in CS)
family: mammal
color: white & brown
hasPart: tail
hasPart: four legs
atLocation: lawn 
…
Lessie
family: mammal
color: brown & black
hasPart: tail
hasPart: four legs
atLocation: home 
…
Scooby-Doo
…
Exemplars
(region points in CS)
kingdom: animalia
phylum: chordata
class: mammalia
order: carnivora
genus: canis 
…
dog
Ontological 
information
Concept dog
Fig. 1. Heterogeneous representation of the dog concept in the hybrid knowledge base.
scribe the conceptual spaces [13]. Conversely, we use
a resource-driven approach that exploits: BabelNet, a
multilingual encyclopedic resource built on WordNet
and Wikipedia [49]; the lexical vectors in NASARI [9],
a vectorial representation of BabelNet; and Concept-
Net, a large scale semantic network aimed at express-
ing common-sense knowledge [23].6 In order to auto-
matically fill the conceptual spaces dimensions (which
have been devised beforehand to represent mainly the
animals and physical objects) with their values, we
have designed a two-steps procedure, including a se-
mantic extraction phase and a semantic match phase.
5. Building a KB for CSs Processing
In this Section we provide an overview of the meth-
ods used for the automatic population of conceptual
6All mentioned resources are either built on top or directly linked
to WordNet (WN), which is a lexical database for the English lan-
guage [45]. Rather than organizing terms alphabetically (like ordi-
nary dictionaries, where senses are possibly scattered) WN groups
terms into synonyms sets called synsets, that are equipped with short
definitions and usage examples. Such sets are represented as the
nodes of a large semantic network, where the intervening edges rep-
resent a number of semantic relations among synset elements (such
as hyponymy, hypernymy, antonymy, meronymy, holonymy).
spaces starting from linguistic resources. A complete
description of this module can be found in [35]. The
portion of the system performing this task is called
TTCS (so named after ‘Terms to Conceptual Spaces’).
The TTCS system takes in input a pair 〈t, ct〉, where t
is a term and ct is the BabelSynset ID representing a
sense underlying t, 7 and produces as output a set of
7The pairs term-concept fed to the TTCS are obtained through the
CLOSEST algorithm, that takes in input a term and provides in out-
put its most common senses (BabelSynset IDs). The CLOSEST algo-
rithm solves a well-known problem afflicting most lexical resources
(such as WordNet and BabelNet): that is, too fine-grained seman-
tic distinctions may be unnecessary and even detrimental in many
tasks [55]. The CLOSEST algorithm thus produces more coarse-
grained sense inventories based on a simple heuristics. It is largely
acknowledged that, in human lexical and conceptual systems, the
main senses of a given term gained more room than its marginal
senses. This phenomenon determines the availability and salience
of words and phrases [60]. These aspects are also reflected in au-
tomatically built encyclopedic resources, where the main senses
are assumed to be more richly represented, in accordance with
their use in spoken and written language. Building on these in-
sights, the CLOSEST algorithm takes in input a term t and returns
{ct1, ct2, . . . , ctn}, the list containing the most relevant senses for t.
Full details on this module can be found in [36].
6 Lieto et al. / Towards a Unifying Framework for Conceptual Represention and Reasoning in Cognitive Systems
ISA PARTOF MEMBEROF HASA
CAPABLEOF ATLOCATION HASPROPERTY ATTRIBUTE
MADEOF SYMBOLOF USEDFOR INSTANCEOF
Table 1
The list of the considered ConceptNet relations.
attribute-value pairs, in the form⋃
d∈D
{〈IDd, {v1, · · · , vn}〉} (1)
where IDd is the identifier of the d-th quality dimen-
sion, and {v1, · · · , vn} is the set of values chosen for
d. Such values will be used as fillers for Conceptual
Space dimensions d ∈ D. The output of the system is
then a Conceptual Space representation for the input
term t.
The control strategy implemented by the TTCS in-
cludes two main steps, semantic extraction and seman-
tic matching. In the semantic extraction step we ex-
plore the ConceptNet associations regarding the term t
and select only those involving t in the sense intended
by ct, thus producing a bag-of-concepts C semanti-
cally related to the seed term. In the semantic matching
step, a new empty exemplar is created, corresponding
to an empty vector in the CSs; we then use the bag-of-
concepts extracted in the previous step to identify the
values appropriate as fillers for the Conceptual Space
quality dimensions.
Semantic Extraction. In the semantic extraction step,
we access the ConceptNet node associated with t and
scan its incoming and outgoing edges: in so doing we
retrieve the related terms. The list of 12 relations that
are presently considered –out of the 57 relations avail-
able in ConceptNet– is provided in Table 1. Since Con-
ceptNet does not provide any anchoring mechanism to
associate its terms to meaning identifiers (BabelSynset
IDs), it is necessary to determine which edges are rel-
evant for the concept associated to t. In other words,
when we access the ConceptNet page for t, we find not
only the edges regarding t with a given sense, but all
the edges regarding t in any possible meaning. To se-
lect only (and possibly all) the edges that concern the
sense ct, we introduce the notion of relevance. To give
an intuition of this process, terms found in ConceptNet
are relevant (and thus retained) either if they exhibit a
heavy weight in the NASARI vector corresponding to
the considered concept, or if they share at least some
terms with the NASARI vector. Finally, relevant terms
are disambiguated and added to the bag of concepts
C [35, pp. 438–41]. For example, given in input the
pair 〈bank, cbank〉, where cbank = 00008364n is the
ID corresponding to the sense ‘A bank is a financial in-
stitution that creates credit by lending money to a bor-
rower’, we inspect the edges of the ConceptNet node
‘bank’ and thanks to the relevance notion we get rid of
sentences such as ‘bank ISA flight maneuver’ since the
term ‘flight maneuver’ is not present in the vector asso-
ciated to concept cbank; conversely, we’ll accept sen-
tences such as ‘bank HASA branch’. Finally, ‘branch’
will be identified as a concept and its BabelSynset ID
will be added to C.
Semantic Matching. The semantic matching step
consists in generating a new exemplar ex in the CS
representation, and in filling it with the information
previously extracted. An exemplar is basically a list of
sets of BabelSynset IDs, where each set corresponds
to a quality dimension; it is named and identified in
accordance with the seed term t and its meaning ct.
The system adopts a set of quality dimensions that
has been designed to meet the representational require-
ments posed by a set of sentences and cross-domain
concepts collected in the frame of an interdisciplinary
research project, aimed at investigating the neurosci-
entific bases of lexical processing. The selected qual-
ity dimensions aim at representing perceptually salient
features (such as size, shape and color), with common-
sense knowledge (e.g., partOf, hasPart, function) and
taxonomic information (class, family). Some of these
dimensions were borrowed from (the most frequent
ones in) ConceptNet, whilst in other cases it was nec-
essary to undertake an ad-hoc approach, as illustrated
below. Without loss of generality, the considered set
of dimensions can be extended or refined to describe
some specific domain, for example by devising further
dimensions to represent physical dimensions.
The process of assigning a certain value to a qual-
ity dimension is called dimension anchoring, and its
implementation differs according to the way quality
dimensions are filled: every quality dimension can be
filled either based on ConceptNet or on a dictionary.
In the former case (ConceptNet-driven approach) the
process of extracting values to fill d leverages the set of
edges; in the latter case (dictionary-driven approach)
we exploit the dictionary associated with the qual-
ity dimension d. Additionally, every quality dimension
can be metric or not (the whole picture is provided in
Table 2). For metric quality dimensions we devised a
set of translation maps (e.g., in the case of color, we di-
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Name BabelSynset ID Metric DD CND
class 00016733n no - ISA
family 00032896n no 3 -
shape 00021751n no 3 -
color 00020726n yes 3 -
locationEnv 00057017n yes 3 -
atLocation 00051760n no - ATLOCATION
feeding 00029546n yes 3 -
hasPart 00021395n no - HASA
partOf 00021394n no - PARTOF
locomotion 00051798n yes 3 -
symbol 00075653n no - SYMBOLOF
function 00036822n no - USEDFOR
Table 2
List of the considered quality dimensions; the last two columns in-
dicate respectively whether each dimension is filled in a dictionary-
driven (DD) or in a ConceptNet-driven (CND) way.
rectly translate the red color into its L*a*b color space:
〈53, 80, 67〉).
In the conceptual spaces framework metrical val-
ues are fundamental to be able to compute forms of
common-sense reasoning by exploiting the distances
between exemplars in the resulting geometrical frame-
work. After the new exemplar ex is filled with the val-
ues extracted through the above mentioned procedure,
we translate the values of the metric quality dimen-
sions by exploiting the related translation maps. Trans-
lation maps have been devised to map the extracted
values onto the corresponding set of metric values in
the conceptual space. For example, the locomotion di-
mension is used to account for the type of movement
(1:swim, 2:dig, 3:crawl, 4:walk, 5:run, 6:roll, 7:jump,
8:fly). In the conceptual space representation the above
mentioned values are translated into a numerically or-
dered scale such that the distance between indexes of
values mirrors the semantic distance between the dif-
ferent types of locomotion: e.g., in this setting “dig”
and “crawl” are assumed to be closer than “swim” and
“fly” [7].
5.1. Building the CSs representation
In order to build an actual conceptual space, the
TTCS took in input a set of 593 cross-domain pairs
term-concept. To briefly account for the computational
effort required in the KB building process, the TTCS
handled over 2.8M NASARI vectors (restricting to
consider the first 100 features); these were at the base
of the relevance computation. In the extraction step,
the TTCS accessed around 10M of ConceptNet asser-
tions, linking about 3M nodes; specifically, 28K Con-
ceptNet nodes (on average 47.6 per input term) were
extracted and 2.3K of them were selected as relevant
and finally disambiguated.
The semantic extraction step ended up with 516
success cases, where the bag-of-concepts C contained
at least one extracted concept. The 76 failures were
caused by the lack of the ConceptNet node for the in-
put term, rather than by the extraction of irrelevant
concepts. Further 30 input terms were dropped because
their final bag-of-concepts did not contain any suit-
able value to fill the exemplars. This led to a total of
486 correctly extracted exemplars, and to filling over-
all 2, 388 dimensions (on average 4.9 per exemplar).
6. Categorization Pipeline of the System
In this Section we briefly recall, for the sake of self-
containedness, how the whole categorization pipeline
of DUAL-PECCS works. The overall details can be
found in [39,40]. The input to the system is a simple
linguistic description, like “The feline with mane”, and
the expected output is a given category evoked by the
description (e.g., the category lion in this case). Af-
ter an Information Extraction (IE) step8, the input in-
formation is encoded into an internal format devised
to store conceptual spaces information, which is then
used as input in the categorization task. The system
answers rely on the the output of S1 and S2, respec-
tively. In particular: according to the linguistic stimu-
lus being categorized DUAL-PECCS chooses, based
on a similarity calculation between the stimulus and
the typical representations available in S1 knowledge
base, whether to select an exemplar of a prototype
(we refer to this process as S1 categorization). By
following a preference that has been experimentally
observed in human cognition [44], our algorithm fa-
vors the results of the exemplars-based categorization
if the knowledge-base stores any exemplars similar
to the input being categorized. Once the result of S1
8A shallow IE approach has been devised, where the morphologi-
cal information computed from input sentences has been used to de-
vise a simple finite-state automaton describing the input sentences’
structure (more on the input descriptions in Section 8). This ap-
proach would not scale to handle more complex sentences. We defer
to future work the adoption of richer language models. Despite these
limitation, however, it allowed us to complete the automatization of
the software pipeline going all throughout from the simple linguis-
tic input description used for the evaluation (that will be described
later) to its final conceptual categorization.
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is selected (i.e., either a prototype or an exemplar is
proxyfied in working memory), such approximate cat-
egorization result is then checked with the ontologi-
cal knowledge base of S2 (we refer to this process as
S1-S2 categorization). This check is implemented by
type 2 processes, and it is therefore based on deduc-
tive inference. If the categorization result provided by
S1 is consistent with the ontology, then the catego-
rization succeeded and the category provided by S2 is
returned along with the top scoring class returned by
S1. Otherwise the system evaluates a fixed amount of
S1 candidates, meantime keeping track of the incon-
sistent elements: in case all such candidates are incon-
sistent w.r.t. the ontology in S2, the output of S2, com-
puted independently of S1, is provided along with the
first result initially. The control strategy implements a
tradeoff between ontological inference and the output
of S1, which is more informative but also formally less
reliable.
6.1. Mapping Conceptual Spaces and Ontological
Representation
A relevant issue we face is aligning knowledge re-
sources based on different sorts of representational for-
malisms. Under an architectural perspective, S1 and
S2 rely on knowledge bases encoded in different ways,
which need to be connected and mapped onto a shared
and uniform representation of meaning in order to al-
low the SOAR and LIDA layers to operate them (see
Section 7).
The heterogeneous proxytypes approach, in partic-
ular, requires the existence of co-referring representa-
tional structures to account for conceptual knowledge.
Such co-reference relies on the fact that all the differ-
ent bodies of knowledge are assumed to semantically
point to the main reference conceptual container. In
our system, such a container has been automatically
provided with a WordNet synset ID. In addition, also
the pointing representations, containing the different
types of conceptual knowledge, have been equipped
with the same WordNet synset ID referred to their
corresponding concept. The anchoring mechanism be-
tween such heterogeneous representations follows two
different ways. The first one corresponds to the map-
ping between the concept and its related ontological
component. This mapping is provided in the OpenCyc
ontology, which is sometimes equipped with the infor-
mation regarding the corresponding WordNet synset
ID. On the other hand, the anchoring between the con-
ceptual space representations and the corresponding
general concept is obtained thanks to the connection
obtained with the BabelNet linguistic resource via the
TTCS subsystem. In particular, since most of the lexi-
cal items in BabelNet used by the TTCS are equipped
with a WordNet synset ID, once the overall output of
the TTCS is obtained, the typical Knowledge Base rep-
resented as conceptual spaces results to be automati-
cally equipped with WordNet synsets. Once this map-
ping is provided, such representation is linked to the
corresponding identifier of the general concept it be-
longs to. The Figure 2 shows a pictorial representa-
tions of the resources involved to build our co-referring
representational structure.
7. Integration in SOAR and LIDA
The current system has been integrated with two ad-
ditional widely known cognitive architectures9: SOAR
[26] and LIDA [16]. SOAR is one of the most mature
cognitive architectures and has been used by many re-
searchers worldwide during the last 30-years. One of
the main themes in SOAR is that all cognitive tasks
can be represented by problem spaces that are searched
by production rules grouped into operators. These pro-
duction rules are fired in parallel to produce reasoning
cycles. From a representational perspective, SOAR ex-
ploits symbolic representations of knowledge (called
chunks) and uses pattern matching and spreading ac-
tivation to select relevant knowledge elements. The
LIDA architecture, on the other hand, is a partial im-
plementation of the LIDA cognitive model [17] and
employs a variety of modules that are designed using a
variety of computational mechanisms drawn from AI.
A peculiarity of this architecture resides in its detailed
workflow determining the interactions between auto-
matic (sub-conscious) processes and controlled (con-
scious) ones in the memory systems of its agent. Such
model is explicitly grounded on the Global Workspace
Theory [4,5].
The rationale underlying such integration efforts
was to investigate whether the outlined approach is
compatible with architectures implementing different
cognitive theories of mind, so to be able to argue that
9The term "cognitive architecture" was introduced by Allen
Newell and his colleagues in their work on unified theories of cogni-
tion [50]. One of the main reasons justifying the introduction of such
systems in the AI and Computational Cognitive Science fields was
the goal of reaching human level intelligence in a general setting (on
the role of CAs for general intelligent systems see also [32]).
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Fig. 2. Resources involved for the grounding of heterogeneous representations via WordNet.
it can be considered as a framework general enough
for representation and reasoning on conceptual infor-
mation.
One main difference between the two architectures
is that LIDA is considered a hybrid architecture, while
SOAR, on the other hand, is entirely symbolic. In
particular, LIDA employs both symbolic and subsym-
bolic representational elements, and, more specifically,
it employs the subsymbolic activation of symbolic rep-
resentational chunks; SOAR adheres to the Newell
and Simon’s physical symbol system hypothesis [51]
which states that symbolic processing is a necessary
and sufficient condition for intelligent behavior [50].
Both architectures, however, are not natively dual-
process based. Therefore in both cases, the dual mech-
anisms of reasoning needed to be explicitly designed
and instantiated within an existing general framework.
In addition, none of the architectures addresses the
problem concerning the representation of (and the
reasoning on) common-sense knowledge components,
such as prototypes and exemplars (and the related rea-
soning strategies). In SOAR this problem arises de-
spite the fact that the chunks can be represented as a
sort of frame-like structures containing some common-
sense (e.g., prototypical) information. In fact, the main
problem of this architecture w.r.t. the heterogeneity
assumption, relies on the fact that it does not spec-
ify how the typical conceptual components (that can
eventually be represented in terms of frame-like slots)
and the corresponding non monotonic-reasoning strat-
egy, can interact with a possibly conflicting represen-
tational and reasoning procedures characterizing a dif-
ferent conceptualisation of the same conceptual en-
tity 10. In short it assumes, like most of the symbolic-
oriented CAs, the availability of a monolithic concep-
tual structure (e.g., a frame-like prototype or a classi-
cal concept) without specifying how such information
can be integrated and harmonized with other knowl-
edge components to form the whole knowledge spec-
trum characterizing a given concept. In LIDA, on the
other hand, despite many kinds of approximate com-
parisons and similarity-based reasoning (e.g., in tasks
such as categorization), are, in theory, possible to ex-
ecute, the peculiarity concerning prototype or exem-
plars based representations (along with the the design
of the interaction between their different reasoning
strategies) is not provided. In this sense, the integra-
tion of DUAL-PECCS with such architectures yields
10A classical example of the described situation is the following:
let us think to the case of WHALE. A prototypical conceptualization
would classify whales as FISH (since a whale share many typical
traits with fishes). On the other hand, a classical conceptualization
would classify whales as MAMMAL.
10 Lieto et al. / Towards a Unifying Framework for Conceptual Represention and Reasoning in Cognitive Systems
as profit a significant improvement in their representa-
tional and inferential power.
As for the previous integrations [39,40], for both
architectures we focused on the Declarative Memory
(also named Semantic Memory), and Working Mem-
ory modules, and on the corresponding retrieval mech-
anisms. Besides, the dual process strategies of concept
categorization have been integrated into SOAR and
LIDA processes and connected to the retrieval request
executed in the Working Memory.
Figure 3 gives a very general overview of the ratio-
nale behind the described integration of DUAL-PECCS
with different cognitive architectures. The DUAL-PECCS
knowledge base in this diagram is to be intended as a
sort of extension of the declarative memory modules
available in the considered architectures, and it can in-
teract with the different working memory areas to per-
form reasoning.
It is worth-noting that, in the literature, there are ef-
forts proposed to extend the Declarative Memories of
CAs in order to enable more complex and cognitively
inspired forms of reasoning. To this class of works be-
longs that one proposed by [53] aiming at extending
the knowledge layer of ACT-R with external ontolog-
ical content related to the event modelling or that one
by Salvucci [58], enriching the knowledge model of
the Declarative Memory (DM) of ACT-R with a world-
level knowledge base such as DBpedia (i.e. the seman-
tic version of Wikipedia represented in terms of on-
tological formalisms) and a previous one proposed in
[6] presenting an integration of the ACT-R Declarative
and Procedural Memory with the Cyc ontology [29].
The main problematic aspect concerning the extension
of the DM with such wide-coverage integrated onto-
logical resources, however, is that the underlying for-
malisms of such frameworks only allow to represent
conceptual information in terms of symbolic struc-
tures. As a consequence, they encounter the standard
problems affecting this class of representations in deal-
ing with the representation of common-sense knowl-
edge components, mostly absent in such resources (for
a more detailed and extended discussion we refer the
interested reader to [34]). In this sense, they provide
an integration only with the S2 classical conceptual
component. This aspect represents a problem since all
these integrated symbolic systems do not represent at
all the typical information associated to a given con-
cept. As we will see in more detail in Section 8, this
phenomenon prevents the type of common-sense con-
ceptual retrieval based on typical traits that, on the
other hand, represent one of the main contributions re-
sulting by our integrations.
7.1. SOAR Integration
Concepts are represented in SOAR as empty chunks
(that is, chunks having no associated information, ex-
cept for the WordNet synset ID and a human readable
name), referred to by the external bodies of knowl-
edge (prototypes and exemplars) acting like semantic
pointers. Here we have integrated the hybrid knowl-
edge base directly into the semantic memory or SMEM
of SOAR, that is equivalent to the Declarative Mem-
ory in LIDA and ACT-R. This sort of memory is ac-
cessed through two dedicated working memory chan-
nels, called ˆcommand and ˆresult. In particu-
lar, ˆcommand is the branch of the working memory
buffer where the informational query being posed to
the semantic memory is provided. In our implementa-
tion this piece of information is filled with the infor-
mation extracted from the input description, which is
automatically converted into a SOAR chunk request.
This conversion allows us to consider both the query
and its result in terms of the SOAR representational
language. However, instead of querying the standard
Semantic Memory in SOAR, we have introduced some
modification to the architecture by working on the
SOAR Kernel and by creating novel RHS (Right Hand
Side) functions to query the external S1 knowledge
base in order to take advantage of the similarity based
reasoning possible in the conceptual spaces. The result
of the first categorization process (based on common-
sense information) produces in output the exemplar or
prototype-based representation that is closer to the lin-
guistic stimulus in input. Such result is stored in the
ˆresult channel, the branch of the SOAR working
memory buffer devoted to acquiring the output from
the external modules. Once the result of S1 is “prox-
yfied”, it is then checked, by executing a novel set of
RHS functions, on a second extension of the SOAR
Semantic Memory corresponding to the Cyc Ontology.
The final response of the second categorization step,
based on S2 procedures, is stored in the ˆresult
channel to check S1’s result consistency with the on-
tological model. In case an inconsistency is detected,
the following best results of S1 proxyfication is tested
until a concept is returned that is compliant with the
ontology in S2.
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Fig. 3. General overview of the DUAL-PECCS integration within different cognitive architectures.
7.2. LIDA Integration
The integration at the representational and reason-
ing level in LIDA followed the same rationale as indi-
cated for SOAR. In particular, we adapted the follow-
ing modules of the architecture to integrate the struc-
ture assumed in DUAL-PECCS:
– the Sensory Module, receiving input from the ex-
ternal environment and implementing the IE step;
– the Perceptual Associative Memory (PAM), that
receives the encoded linguistic stimulus by the
Sensory Module and sends its instantiation to a
working memory buffer called Workspace;
– the Declarative Memory, that is queried via a cue-
based retrieval by the Workspace.
The dual process based categorization mechanisms
have been implemented based on the following proce-
dure: every request is encoded in the Workspace work-
ing memory as a particular type of instance (instance
chunk). The dimensions and values of every instance
chunk are filled by the PAM module with the infor-
mation extracted from the linguistic description. Such
process is arranged as a series of rounds, each produc-
ing a query, by using the cue retrieval mechanism pro-
vided by the architecture, to the implicit S1 compo-
nent and to the explicit S2 module. As indicated in
Section 6, these mechanisms require to handle differ-
ent types of responses returned by the dual systems.
Such responses involve different parts of the memory
structure of LIDA. In particular, once the the chunk re-
quest is built, a retrieval request is executed on the S1
knowledge base, with the aim at retrieving an exem-
plar or a prototype-based representation. The obtained
S1 result is then proxyfied and temporarily stored in
a buffer of the LIDA working memory (the so called
Workspace). Afterward, a second request is sent to the
Declarative Memory in order to check, as previously
illustrated, the results of the S1 with the external S2
knowledge base represented by the Cyc ontology.
An important aspect that is modelled in LIDA re-
gards the fact that, while the consistency check of
the second request to S2 is performed, the tempo-
rary result obtained by the S1 categorization process is
broadcasted to the entire system. By using the LIDA’s
architectural terminology, this means that the S1 re-
sult stored in the working memory buffer (and waiting
for the S2 response) is also sent to the to the Global
Workspace module of the architecture. This additional
step allows the system to make immediately available
the S1 output to the remaining modules of the architec-
tures without waiting for the slow S2 result. This pro-
cess enables the LIDA agents to perform other tasks
in real time with the available information. In case the
response of S2 results inconsistent with the previous
S1 result (and if the task for which the categorization
was requested is still in focus), then the architecture
will be available to broadcast to the Global Workspace
a revised answer.
12 Lieto et al. / Towards a Unifying Framework for Conceptual Represention and Reasoning in Cognitive Systems
8. Evaluation
By following the suggestions presented in [52] we
tested our integrated categorization system in a con-
ceptual categorization task very similar to the psycho-
logical test known as “Word Reasoning”. For human
subjects, the Word Reasoning task consists in identi-
fying a concept based on one to three clues. The tes-
tee might be told “You can see through it” as a first
clue; “It is square and you can open it”, and so on.
The processing required by a Word Reasoning items
goes beyond retrieval because the testee has to inte-
grate the clues and choose among alternative hypothe-
ses. In addition, such task can be seen as a common-
sense reasoning one,known to be still on of the grand
challenges of AI [46], since the answer to ths kind
of queries require to resort to a “common knowledge
about the world that is possessed by every schoolchild
that has the methods for making obvious inferences
from this knowledge” [11]. Unfortunately, as reported
by [52], the standard specific questions provided for
this task in the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale
of Intelligence are proprietary. Nonetheless, the gen-
eral structure of each sentence is public, so that we
have re-used a dataset composed of 111 linguistic de-
scriptions (corresponding to very simple riddles) de-
signed by a team of linguists and neuroscientist in the
frame of a research project investigating neural corre-
lates of lexical processing. Such descriptions exhibit a
structure similar to that of the Word Reasoning task:
on average, no more than 3 cues are present in each
riddle. The descriptions were given in input to the im-
plemented system. An example of such descriptions is
“The mice hunter with whiskers and long tail”, where
the expected category to be retrieved was cat, and in
particular its representation corresponding to the “pro-
totype of cat”; conversely, a description such as “The
felin mice hunter without fur” was expected to lead
as answer to “exemplar of canadian-sphynx”. The ex-
pected categorical targets represent a gold standard,
since they correspond to the results provided by 45 hu-
man subjects in a psychological experimentation. The
present experimentation extends that presented by [39]
in several ways: firstly, the simulation of the catego-
rization processes is now performed on two additional,
integrated, cognitive architectures; secondly, it consid-
ers an extended dataset; finally, more than half of the
S1 knowledge base has been automatically extracted,
as described in Section 5.
We designed a twofold experimentation where our
system results were compared with both the human re-
sponses, and with the results obtained by other sys-
tems: Wolfram Alpha, and two general-purpose search
engines (Google and Bing) used in question-answering
mode [24]. In particular, for the search engines we
compared our system results with the first 10 answers
they returned for each riddle/query.11 We then man-
ually evaluated the content of each page in order to
assess whether the resulting document was associated
to the expected category (i.e., expected w.r.t. the hu-
man answers). We tested the whole pipeline, where
the salient information is extracted by starting from
the linguistic description, the corresponding represen-
tation is retrieved, proxyfied and loaded in working
memory, in both the architectures, according to the
dual process approach. The information extraction of
the linguistic input is not implemented in the two cog-
nitive architectures, but it relies on the CoreNLP Stan-
ford Parser [43], which is used to convert the tex-
tual description into a chunk request. Our evaluation
records two distinct metrics:
– Concept-categorization accuracy (CC-ACC met-
ric); this metric is intended to evaluate the fi-
nal categorization, that is the accuracy in retriev-
ing the expected concept (in this case, the wrong
proxyfication did not count as error).
– Proxyfication accuracy (P-ACC metric); this met-
ric is intended to evaluate whether given in in-
put a description evoking a given concept, the ex-
pected proxyfied representation was retrieved. In
this case the confusion between prototype and ex-
emplar (or between exemplars) is scored as an er-
ror even if the expected category is returned.
8.1. Results and Discussion
The integrated system shows good results for the de-
tection of the expected concepts, compared to both hu-
11We considered the first 10 results returned by the search en-
gines, and not only the first one, since we are aware that these sys-
tems are not standard Question-Answering Systems. However, the
underlying purpose of such systems can be plausibly ascribed to the
area of Question-Answering, that is, the search engines try to an-
swer to queries, that express a question/information need and looks
for an answer. This fact is corroborated by evidence in literature,
showing that over more than 80% of Web queries are informational
in nature [24], and by recent works in QA and in Semantic Textual
Similarity [1,48]. In particular, in these settings, a relevant trend is
based on adopting IR techniques that —rather than focussing on the
generation of direct answers— are aimed, as the search engines, at
finding text excerpts that contain the answer within large collections
of documents [47].
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Table 3
The accuracy results (Table 3-a) and the analysis of the proxyfication
errors (Table 3-b).
a. Accuracy rates obtained for the conceptual categorization
accuracy (CC-ACC) and proxyfication accuracy (P-ACC)
metrics.
test CC-ACC P-ACC
Integrated System/Humans 76.6% (85/111) 67.1% (57/85)
Google/Humans 66.7% (74/111) 71.6% (53/74)
Bing/Humans 60.4% (67/111) 77.7% (52/67)
W. Alpha/Humans 2.07% (3/111) 100% (3/3)
b. Analysis of the errors in the proxyfication (P-ACC met-
rics).
test
Proxyfication error
Ex-Proto Proto-Ex Ex-Ex
System 28.2% (24/85) 0.0% (0/85) 4.7% (4/85)
Google 6.8% (5/74) 18.9% (14/74) 2.7% (2/74)
Bing 7.4% (5/67) 1.4% (1/67) 13.4% (9/67)
W.Alpha 0.0% (0/3) 0.0% (0/3) 0.0% (0/3)
man and artificial systems responses. These figures are
reported in Table 3-a. Table 3-b reports the detailed
errors committed in the proxyfication phase. Provided
that proxyfication errors occur only when the con-
cept has been correctly categorized, three kinds of er-
rors were recorded: an exemplar returned in place of
an expected prototype (column Ex-Proto); a prototype
returned in place of an expected exemplar (column
Proto-Ex), or a wrong exemplar retrieved in place of a
correct one (e.g., an individual of polar_bear in place
of an individual of asian_black_bear, column Ex-Ex).
Compared to human response the vast majority of
errors of our system are due to the confusion between
exemplars and prototypes. In particular, in the 28.2%
of the considered stimuli an exemplar-proxyfied rep-
resentation has been returned by the system in spite
of the expected prototype. This unexpected error is
due to the heuristics —proper to human cognition [44]
and implemented by the categorization algorithm —
that favors the results of the exemplars-based cate-
gorization w.r.t. their prototypical counterpart. While
this heuristics is helpful in most cases, the analysis of
such proxyfication errors points out that the interac-
tion of such common-sense reasoning mechanisms de-
serves additional clarification in the theoretical and ex-
perimental psychological literature. Such heuristics, in
fact, resulted counterintuitive and not efficacious for
the correct categorization of general descriptions.
The other systems suffer from different problems:
in particular, Google committed the majority (18.9%)
of errors in favoring prototypes over expected exem-
plars, whilst the predominant error in Bing was due to
the retrieval of a wrong exemplar (Ex-Ex error). The
results of Wolfram Alpha, finally, were not surprising
since this system is able to answer classical scientific-
oriented queries, while it is not yet equipped to deal
with common-sense knowledge and reasoning. This
aspect, in fact, still represents one of the more chal-
lenging aspects in the current knowledge-based AI sys-
tems [30] affecting, as reported in [12], also systems
such as IBM Watson.12
Additional empirical results supporting the feasibil-
ity of the overall dual-process based framework are
provided in [34]. Such results, that we mention here for
the sake of completeness, show that the S1-S2 com-
ponent adopted in DUAL-PECCS presents by far bet-
ter results with respect to those obtained by consider-
ing only an S2 “ontological” knowledge component in
isolation (this test has been executed by using, as S2,
different large ontological knowledge bases such as
Cyc [29] and DBpedia [3]). This finding is consistent
with the hypothesis that the typicality based knowl-
edge component, in our environment associated to the
S1 module, is crucial for common-sense question an-
swering.
9. Conclusions
This paper has proposed, as a unifying representa-
tional and reasoning framework for artificial agents,
a cognitively-inspired conceptual architecture imple-
mented in a system which has now been integrated
into SOAR and LIDA. The proposed framework has
shown a good deal of compatibility with such general
12A comparison with the Watson system for common-sense
queries represents a mid-term evaluation goal. We recently
(in Spring/Summer 2017) inspected the possibility of query-
ing the Watson system by using its Open Services https:
//www.ibm.com/watson/products-services/. Unfor-
tunately, the available services do not provide the possibility of
querying the Watson Knowledge Base. Currently, in fact, every user
can create his/her own KB collecting a set of documents and then an-
swer queries on the internal representation extracted from that doc-
uments. Despite this is an interesting feature, in our opinion a com-
parison with an ad-hoc built Knowledge Base would be unfair and
rather difficult to actually implement.
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cognitive architectures making different assumptions
about the structures and processes of human cognition
(and of human-like cognition in AI systems). Although
there is room for both refining the framework and
tuning the implemented system, the results obtained
in a task of common-sense conceptual categorization
are encouraging when compared to both human and
artificial responses. As above mentioned, we stress
that, with respect to our previous work, the extensions
described in this paper enable us to fully collocate
the employed representational framework adopted in
DUAL-PECCS within the recent debate concerning
the identification of a Standard Model of Mind [27]
and, in particular, in the debate concerning the ‘Mem-
ory and Content’ issues of the Declarative Memories
of current Cognitive Architectures. At the current stage
of development, in fact, the employed representational
framework has been proved to be versatile enough to
be integrated with both fully symbolic and hybrid ar-
chitectures endowed with a strong sub-symbolic com-
ponent (e.g., CLARION and LIDA). In our opinion
this is due to the adoption of the Conceptual Spaces
framework as S1 component.13
As a mid term goal, we plan to integrate the
proposed representational and reasoning framework
into further general cognitive architectures (e.g., in
LEABRA [54] or SPAUN [8,14]), based on still
different representational and reasoning assumptions
w.r.t. SOAR and LIDA. Should also these integra-
tions be feasible, we would be allowed to reinforce
our claim that the proposed representational and rea-
soning framework can be used as a reference for the
knowledge level of different cognitive agents, thus
providing a sort of interlingua for heterogeneous ar-
chitectures. In particular, in a multi-agent setting, the
provided framework can be seen as a communication
layer. Such a layer is suited i) to extend the knowledge
stored in the Long Term Memory of the individual
agents; and ii) to provide a more advanced —shared
across the architectures— set of reasoning procedures
to query, retrieve and reason on conceptual knowledge
coupling standard and common-sense reasoning pro-
cedures. Such procedures contribute to fill the gap be-
tween the existing cognitive architectures and the cat-
13For the reasons explaining why the framework of the Concep-
tual Spaces can be considered in Cognitive Architectures an effica-
cious, intermediate, representational level connecting symbolic and
sub-symbolic representations and what are the advantages offered by
such framework with respect to some of the main problems affecting
the representational level of CAs we refer to [10,33].
egorization heuristics used by human cognition and
not previously available (or only partially available) in
those systems [38].
Another strength of the proposed approach regards
the possibility, for diverse cognitive agents, to inter-
pret and process the shared knowledge level, meantime
maintaining the specificities and the constraints proper
to each architecture.
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